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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the 
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy.  Housed at Georgetown University Law 
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative 
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic 
diseases to health care financing and health systems.  The Institute, a joint project of the Law 
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable 
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
 
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has 
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global, 
national, and local communities.  By contributing to a more powerful and deeper 
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill 
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decision-
makers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for 
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives. 
 
 Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon 
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys, 
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many 
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor.  The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare 
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care 
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural, 
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems. 
 
 Scholarship.  O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems, 
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond 
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a 
scientific endeavor.   
 
 Reflective Problem-Solving.  For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes 
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between 
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent 
and knowledge that resides in academia. 
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OVERVIEW 
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern.  In order 
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President 
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health 
reform.  In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, 
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised.  Due to the diverse interests involved, these 
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates.  Therefore, it is critical that 
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that 
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform.  In an effort to 
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the 
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.  
 
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may 
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate.  While other academic and research 
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health 
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health 
reform.  The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key 
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other 
key players.  This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation 
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health 
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES  
 
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policy-
based and those that are legally-based.  Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and 
cannot be considered in isolation.  However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the 
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or 
prohibition.   
 
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of 
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for 
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services.  In contrast, legal issues are 
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution 
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict. 
 
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as 
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning 
with, “Can we…?”  The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular 
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and 
regulations, can we now…?”; 3) “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?”  This 
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.   
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT 
 
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat 
of political debate.  This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems 
addressed are either soluble or avoidable.  Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a 
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.  
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is 
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.  
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or 
make recommendations among them.  Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide 
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal 
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for 
resolving those questions.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, 
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal 
health reform.  After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of 
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten.  An initial framing paper was drafted which identified 
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each.  In May of 2008, a 
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and 
framing of the legal issues.  The attendees of the consultation session included congressional 
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide 
range of interests affected by health reform.  Feedback and analysis from this session further 
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current 
law.   
 
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant 
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made.  There are 
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is 
adopted, the system changes.  In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for 
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
The increased use of health information technology (health IT) is a common element of nearly 
every health reform proposal because it has the potential to decrease costs, improve health 
outcomes, coordinate care, and improve public health.  However, it raises concerns about 
security and privacy of medical information.  This paper examines some of the “gaps” in privacy 
protections that arise out of the current federal health privacy standard, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, the main federal law which governs the 
use and disclosure of health information.  Additionally, it puts forth a range of possible solutions, 
accompanied by arguments for and against each.  The solutions provide some options for 
strengthening the current legal framework of privacy protections in order to build public trust in 
health IT and facilitate its use for health reform.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) enacted in February 2009 includes a number of changes to HIPAA and its regulations, 
and those changes are clearly noted among the list of solutions (and ARRA is indicated below 
where the Act has a relevant provision).  
 
LAW IN EFFECT PRE-ARRA AND PERCEIVED “GAPS”: 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA):  The use of health 
information is currently covered by HIPAA and its implementing regulations.  The Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued final regulations in 2002, which became effective 
for most entities covered by HIPAA in 2003.  The HIPAA privacy regulations set forth rules 
governing the access, use, and disclosure of personal health information by most traditional 
health care entities.  The goal of the regulations is to ensure that health information is rapidly 
accessible to those authorized, but kept confidential and protected from inappropriate use.   
 Who is covered: The Privacy Rule only applies to entities expressly defined in the 
HIPAA statute, which places unmentioned, new, and emerging entities outside the direct 
coverage of the rule. 
 What is covered: The Privacy Rule regulates the type of health information that can be 
shared by covered entities and for what purposes.  But individuals are concerned that 
their personal health information will not be protected in the emerging e-health 
environment.  For example, privacy may be at risk due to the lack of federal notification 
standards for breaches; the possibility that developments in technology may make “de-
identified” data (not covered under the Privacy Rule) re-identifiable; and the lack of 
strong prohibition on the use of personal health information for marketing purposes.  
 State law variation: The Privacy Rule is only a minimum standard, which gives states 
the power to enact more stringent protections for health privacy.  The resulting variations 
in state privacy laws may pose an obstacle to health information exchange across state 
lines and/or to a national health information system. 
 Insufficient comprehension of and compliance with the Privacy Rule and 
enforcement: Entities covered by the Privacy Rule and individuals/patients do not 
adequately comprehend the Privacy Rule’s provisions, leading health care entities to 
either over- or under-interpret the Rule and leaving individuals unaware of their privacy 
rights.  In addition, there has been debate among policymakers and stakeholders over 1) 
whether the Rule to date has been appropriately enforced; 2) whether or not the current 
mechanisms are adequate to ensure compliance; and 3) what the limits of the 
enforcement mechanisms should be. 
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POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: 
The perceived “gaps” in federal legal protections for health information can be grouped into four 
categories: 1) who is covered; 2) what is covered; 3) state law variation; and 4) insufficient 
comprehension of and compliance with privacy protections.  The solutions range from amending 
existing law or regulation to encouraging private action through market or other incentives. 
 Who is covered: Amend HIPAA to create new categories of covered entities and require 
the federal agencies to issue new privacy regulations to cover activities of new entities; 
revise regulations and expand recent guidance on business associate agreements to 
include all health information exchanges in existence or development (ARRA); require 
all entities handling health information to adopt policies consistent with fair information 
practices; and/or keep the law in its current state and encourage adoption of good privacy 
practices through voluntary business agreements. 
 What is covered: Enact federal legislation prohibiting the use of personal heath 
information to determine the terms and conditions of employment or health insurance; 
establish a federal breach notification law applicable to identifiable health information 
(ARRA); seek the input of experts and public to  examine the de-identification safe 
harbor exception (ARRA); create more options for the use of health data stripped of some 
individual identifiers (ARRA) and require data use agreements for all data disclosures; 
require those obtaining data stripped of patient identifiers to commit to keeping data de-
identified except in certain circumstances; strengthen, establish, and increase compliance 
with HIPAA rules regarding the use of personal information for marketing (ARRA); 
adopt rules governing marketing uses by non-covered entities such as Internet health 
sites; issue more guidance on how to comply with the Privacy Rule (ARRA); issue new 
regulations regarding terms of access to health information exchanges. 
 State law variation: “Wipe the slate clean” and have Congress could establish a new 
federal privacy law that preempts existing state laws but allows states to pass new 
stronger privacy provisions; and/or keep the status quo with the federal standard as a 
floor.    
 Improving comprehension of and compliance with the Privacy Rule and 
enforcement: Revise the Privacy Rule to make it less complex; provide more guidance 
and better education on the requirements of the rules (ARRA); improve consumer 
education on HIPAA rights by requiring entities to provide a summary notice; ensure a 
proper enforcement regime for entities not covered by HIPAA that handle personal health 
information; amend HIPAA enforcement to clarify enforcement authority and also direct 
the Secretary to pursue civil actions (ARRA); amend HIPAA to allow the Secretary to 
directly enforce HIPAA regulations against business associates (ARRA); and/or amend 
HIPAA to allow a private right of action (ARRA). 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Generally, there is consensus that efforts to facilitate widespread adoption and use of health 
information technology must move forward with appropriate protections for privacy and 
security.  However, achieving consensus on the details of what privacy and security measures 
need to be put in place continues to be a challenge.  The new Administration and Congress are 
moving forward to increase the use of health IT.  Any efforts to reform the nation’s health 
systems and to increase the adoption of health IT will need to address the concerns surrounding 
the privacy and security of personal health information.  
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform: 
Privacy and Health Information Technology 
Deven McGraw* 
 
Introduction    
 
In discussions of health reform, the increased use of health information technology (health IT) is 
a common element of nearly every serious proposal on the table.  Health IT includes electronic 
health records kept by providers, personal health records offered by health insurance plans or 
owned by consumers, and electronic health information exchanges.  Although health reform 
initiatives being discussed contain little detail regarding health IT, in general they promote health 
IT to facilitate the electronic sharing of health information to improve individual and population 
health.  During the 2008 Presidential Campaign, the health care proposals of both President 
Obama and Senator McCain discussed health IT.  President Obama’s proposal invests $50 billion 
over the next five years to promote the adoption of health IT with privacy safeguards.1  Senator 
McCain’s plan also encouraged the adoption of health IT, with an emphasis on coordination.2   
 
Proponents hope that the increased use of health IT will improve health outcomes for individual 
patients by facilitating the delivery of evidence-based care and reducing medical errors.  
Additionally, proponents hope that increasing information sharing among providers will better 
coordinate care within and across health care settings.  Health IT facilitates the creation of a 
comprehensive health record that can move with an individual over his or her lifetime, in 
contrast to the fragmented records that exist today.  Further, health IT is promoted as a critical 
tool for improving population health by allowing for the more efficient gathering of data 
regarding the effectiveness of certain treatments.  Finally, health IT is also expected to help 
decrease health care costs by reducing the duplication of services and the delivery of unnecessary 
or inappropriate care.  
 
This paper briefly summarizes current federal health privacy law and examines some “gaps” in 
privacy protections that have been identified by some policymakers and stakeholders in recent 
debates on this topic.  Additionally, the paper puts forth a range of possible solutions, 
accompanied by some arguments for and against each idea.  The proposals in the paper do not 
represent the universe of possible solutions to each issue; many of them also are not mutually 
exclusive.  The arguments provided in support for or against a particular idea also do not 
represent all of the arguments for or against any policy option.  The solutions do, however, 
provide some options for continuing the conversation about how we can best strengthen our legal 
framework of privacy protections to build public trust in health IT and facilitate its use to reform 
the health care system.   
 
Note:  The initial version of this paper was completed before enactment of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act in February 2009 (“ARRA”).3  ARRA includes a number of 
provisions amending the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its 
regulations, the main federal law which governs the use and disclosure of health information.  
Because much of the details of the privacy and security provisions in ARRA will need to be 
fleshed out in agency guidance or regulations, and because most of the provisions do not take 
effect until at least a year after enactment, the author of this paper decided not to completely 
revise the paper to incorporate the changes in the law.  Instead, where there is a provision in 
 
O’NEILL INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 
GEORGETOWN LAW | 600 NEW JERSEY AVENUE NW | WASHINGTON, DC 20001 
www.oneillinstitute.org 
4 
ARRA dealing with an issue identified in this paper, a brief summary of that provision is clearly 
indicated within the list of solutions.      
  
There is widespread agreement that protecting individuals’ health information is necessary in 
order to build public trust in e-health systems and to help drive the widespread adoption of health 
IT.  But unlike other topics addressed in the Legal Solutions in Health Reform project, current 
health privacy laws arguably do not pose a legal obstacle to health IT.  For example, there are no 
federal health privacy laws that prohibit or directly inhibit the sharing of information 
electronically for health purposes and that require specific action to resolve.  Instead, the debate 
centers more around whether current health privacy laws are sufficient to build a foundation of 
trust in health IT that will support an information sharing environment that will improve health 
care and our health care system – and if not, what more needs to be done.  This makes the path to 
resolution more difficult, as stakeholders may hold very different opinions about the extent of the 
problem and the appropriate solutions.    
 
Survey data show that a large majority of the public wants electronic access to their health 
information – both for themselves and for their health care providers – because they believe such 
access is likely to increase the quality of their health care.  At the same time, people have 
significant concerns about the privacy of their health information on-line.  In a 2006 survey, 
when Americans were asked about the benefits of and concerns about online health information: 
 
 80% were very concerned about identity theft or fraud; 
 77% were very concerned about their medical information being used for marketing 
purposes; 
 56% were concerned about employers having access to their health information; and 
 53% were concerned about insurers gaining access to this information.4  
 
Health IT is better equipped than are paper records to protect sensitive personal health 
information.  For example, it is often impossible to tell whether someone has inappropriately 
accessed a paper record.  By contrast, technology - including strong user authentication and 
tracking mechanisms - can be employed to automatically limit and monitor access to electronic 
health information.  Additionally, electronic health information exchange networks can be 
designed to facilitate data sharing among health care entities for appropriate purposes without 
needing to create new, centralized databases of sensitive information that will be attractive 
targets for marketers and those seeking health data for commercial gain, or that can be vulnerable 
to security breaches.  If a system is breached, sensitive data can be protected, in part, by 
encryption and other security methods.  Technology can never be made 100% tamperproof – but 
it can be more protective than paper records at preventing inappropriate access to information 
and helping ensure that when there is abuse, the perpetrators will be detected and punished. 
 
At the same time, absent strong privacy and security safeguards, the computerization of personal 
health information can magnify the risk to privacy.  Tens of thousands of health records can be 
accessed through a single breach.5  Recent headlines about breaches of electronic records 
underscore these concerns.  The cumulative effect of reports of data breaches and inappropriate 
access to medical records deepens consumer distrust in the ability of electronic health 
information systems to provide adequate privacy and security protections.   
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Failing to address public concerns about the privacy of their health information could have 
significant consequences.  Without appropriate protections for privacy and security in the 
healthcare system, some patients engage in “privacy-protective” behaviors to avoid having their 
personal health information used inappropriately.6  According to a recent poll, one in six adults 
(17%) – representing about 38 million persons – say they withhold information from their health 
providers due to worries about how the medical data might be disclosed.7  Persons who report 
that they are in fair or poor health and racial and ethnic minorities (who report even higher levels 
of concern about the privacy of their personal medical records) are more likely than average to 
practice privacy-protective behaviors.8  Due to the reality of privacy risks associated with the 
computerization of health information, the movement to e-health could increase the percentage 
of people who engage in privacy protective behaviors.  Ignoring these concerns – or inadequately 
addressing them – will significantly threaten public trust in these new systems.  
 
In general, stakeholders largely agree that entities that handle electronic personal health 
information should be subject to a baseline set of privacy standards.  This consensus breaks 
down, however, when the discussion gets to the details.  For example: 
 
 Do we extend the privacy rules under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) to all entities that now handle health information, or create new legal 
standards for entities not currently covered? 
 What protections need to be in place?  For example, do we rely on current HIPAA rules 
or are modifications needed, either to address new challenges or because the rules, in the 
view of some, were imperfect from the start? 
 Are these concerns best addressed through changes in statute or regulations, or is it best 
to police this nascent marketplace through business best practices (or a combination of 
both)?  
 Should we allow for some state law variation or establish federal standards that preempt 
the field? 
 What should we do to ensure compliance with and appropriate enforcement of privacy 
protections? 
.  
A brief list of all proposed solutions in each category (without explanatory text and without the 
sample arguments for and against) can be found at Appendix A at the end of this paper. 
 
I.   Federal Law Prior to Passage of ARRA (as noted above, changes to law enacted in 
ARRA are set forth below in the “possible solutions” proposed for each issue)  
 
With respect to protecting health information privacy, public policymakers are not faced with a 
blank slate.  Within the traditional healthcare system, uses of health information are covered by 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and its implementing 
regulations.  When Congress enacted HIPAA to facilitate, among other things, the electronic 
transmission of health care claims to reduce administrative costs, lawmakers recognized the need 
to protect the privacy and security of health information when data moves electronically.  
Congress gave itself two years to enact federal privacy legislation – but ended up tasking the 
Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate privacy and security regulations to 
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cover information transactions under the purview of HIPAA.  The regulations were finalized in 
2002 and effective for most entities covered by HIPAA by 2003.  The HIPAA statute sets forth 
the definition of entities covered by the law and important provisions with respect to HIPAA 
enforcement; the bulk of the HIPAA privacy and security requirements are in the regulations.  
 
The HIPAA privacy regulations – known collectively as the “Privacy Rule” – are based on fair 
information practices and set forth rules governing the access, use, and disclosure of personal 
health information (or “protected health information”) 9 by most traditional health care system 
entities (for example, providers, hospitals, laboratories, pharmacies, and health plans).  In 
summary, the Privacy Rule permits covered entities10 to access, use, and disclose “protected 
health information”11 for purposes of treatment,12 payment,13 and health care operations.14  The 
Rule also allows access, use, and disclosure for 1) certain lawful public health purposes, as 
required by law, 2) reporting abuse or domestic violence, 3) health oversight activities, 4) 
judicial and administrative proceedings, and 5) law enforcement purposes.  Covered entities may 
disclose information to family members, and in facility or office directories, as long as the 
patient doesn’t object.  All other purposes not specifically mentioned in the Rule require prior 
patient authorization to access, use, or disclose information.  The Privacy Rule applies to 
identifiable health information regardless of whether it is in paper or electronic form.    
 
HIPAA provides a federal floor, or minimum standard, of privacy protection.  It expressly 
preserves State laws that provide stronger privacy protections for health information.15  Such 
State privacy laws include more stringent requirements regarding access, use and disclosure of 
particularly sensitive categories of health information, such as mental health records and HIV 
testing and treatment records.  The variation in state laws poses difficulties to a uniform privacy 
standard.   
 
Other federal laws apply privacy protections to specific types of information, or have limited 
application in specific contexts.  For example, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008 prohibits employers from using genetic information to make employment decisions and 
prohibits health insurers from using such information to make coverage and underwriting 
determinations.16  The Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act, the regulations governing 
substance abuse treatment facilities receiving federal funds (commonly known as Part 2), and the 
Privacy Act of 1974 cover only certain settings of care.17   
 
With respect to health information on-line or in consumer-owned personal health records, the 
Federal Trade Commission can use its “unfair and deceptive trade practices” authority to hold 
some entities accountable for failure to comply with their privacy policies.  Federal law does not 
require these entities to have a privacy policy, or require that certain elements be included in 
such a policy if it exists.  Some have said that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) protects personal health records (PHRs) because it prohibits the vendors of those 
services from disclosing the contents of those records without the authorization of the record 
holder.  However, the relevant ECPA provision applies only to services that are offered to the 
public.18  PHRs available exclusively to employees of a particular company, for example, likely 
fall outside of this part of ECPA. Moreover, ECPA applies only if the provider is not authorized 
to access the contents of a customer’s records for purposes of providing any services other than 
storage or computer processing.19  This caveat may knock out a lot of PHRs that provide services 
beyond data storage, or that are advertising-based and analyze individual patient records to target 
ads.  
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To keep this paper to a manageable length, it focuses on federal privacy protections that are (or 
could be) more broadly applicable.  
 
II.  Possible Issues to be Resolved  
 
The perceived “gaps” in pre-ARRA federal legal protections for health information can be 
grouped into the following categories:  
 
 Who is Covered:  The HIPAA Privacy Rule covers only certain “covered entities” as 
defined in the HIPAA statute: specifically, providers, plans, and healthcare 
clearinghouses.  Many of the new entities storing, handling or managing personal 
health information electronically do not qualify as covered entities, and thus are not 
directly covered by the Privacy Rule.  As noted above, other federal health privacy 
laws apply only in specific contexts or are otherwise limited in their application.  As a 
result, there is no baseline set of federal health privacy protections that apply to all 
entities that handle personal health information. 
 What is Covered:  The Privacy Rule is based on a model of one-to-one electronic 
transmission of health information among traditional health care system entities and 
their business partners who perform health-related functions on their behalf.  Since 
the HIPAA requirements were enacted and promulgated, new opportunities to access 
and disclose health information have arisen (e.g., electronic health information 
exchanges) which can enhance access to greater volumes of identifiable health 
information more effectively and efficiently.  The Rule also did not envision the rise 
of personal health records designed for use by consumers.  Some believe that truly 
building public trust in e-health systems requires strengthening a number of the 
Privacy Rule’s current provisions and/or the promulgation of new or additional legal 
protections.  Others believe the Privacy Rule provides sufficient protections for health 
information in the new e-health environment, and that policymakers merely need to 
extend its coverage to apply to entities that did not exist when the Privacy Rule was 
implemented.  Similarly, some have suggested approaching this question by focusing 
only on what is new in the e-health environment – new actors or new ways to access, 
use, or disclose information not contemplated when the HIPAA regulations were 
implemented – in order to avoid getting mired in old debates about the current 
HIPAA regulations. 
 State Law Variation: As noted above, HIPAA provides a floor of health privacy 
protection.  State laws that provide more stringent protections for health privacy are 
expressly preserved and not preempted.  Some are concerned that the multiplicity of 
state privacy laws will create an obstacle to cross-state or nationwide electronic 
exchange of health information.  The obstacles may arise because of the operation of 
a state law that prohibits information sharing except under certain circumstances 
(such as with patient consent or authorization), or because health care entities are 
afraid to disclose information in a way that might violate an applicable state law.  
Others suggest that any information sharing obstacles are primarily due to a lack of 
understanding and varying interpretations of state laws, which does not necessarily 
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justify eliminating stronger state privacy protections and enacting a single federal 
standard. 
 Improving Understanding of (and Compliance with) Privacy Protections:  Even 
five years after the Privacy Rule went into effect, there is still a great deal of 
confusion on the part of some entities covered by the Rule about its provisions.  For 
example, the 34 state teams participating in the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ)-funded Privacy and Security Solutions for Interoperable Health 
Information Exchange consistently found a “general lack of understanding about 
some of the basic tenets” of the Privacy Rule as well as of state laws concerning 
health information disclosure.20  The frequent result is a more conservative 
interpretation of the law – a reluctance to disclose information even in circumstances 
where it is expressly permitted – which could create unnecessary and sometimes 
inappropriate barriers to electronic health information exchange.21  Patients and their 
families also rarely understand the provisions of the HIPAA privacy notice, which is 
the vehicle in the Privacy Rule for informing patients about the potential uses of their 
health information and their rights under the Rule.22  
A. Who Is Covered  
 
As noted above, HIPAA by statute covers only providers (including health care professionals, 
hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories), health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses.23  Thus the 
HIPAA privacy and security regulations also apply only to these covered entities.  Under the 
Privacy Rule, a covered entity can contract with a “business associate:” an organization that 
receives personal health information to perform activities or services on behalf of the covered 
entity, but is not part of their workforce.  The HIPAA rules do not apply directly to business 
associates; instead, business associates must be obligated by contract with the covered entity to 
comply with the HIPAA regulations.  A business associate must enter into a “business associate 
agreement” with the covered entity in order to access protected health information.24  This 
agreement must: 1) spell out the required uses and disclosures of such information by the 
business associate, 2) include a provision prohibiting the business associate from further using or 
disclosing the data other than as permitted in the contract or required by law, and 3) contain 
“satisfactory assurances” that the business associate will “appropriately safeguard the 
information.”25  The HIPAA rules cannot be enforced by the federal government against 
business associates, as discussed in more detail below.   
 
HIPAA currently does not cover a number of entities that have emerged as part of the movement 
to electronic health records.  For example: 
 
 State and regional electronic health information exchanges – often called Regional Health 
Information Organizations (or RHIOs) or Health Information Exchanges (HIEs) – and 
ePrescribing Gateways, all of which may collect or facilitate the exchange of personal 
health information, usually among health care system entities, are not HIPAA covered 
entities.26  In December 2008 HHS issued guidance clarifying that health information 
networks that merely exchange data on behalf of covered entities must be business 
associates and thus must execute business associate agreements.27  However, such 
guidance does not cover all of the health information exchanges currently in existence or 
in development.  For example, exchanges that collect and directly access information in a 
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centralized database are not covered by this guidance, and as a result their status under 
HIPAA is unclear.  
 Personal health records (PHRs) and other consumer-facing health IT tools now being 
created by Internet companies like Microsoft, Google, and WebMD, as well as by 
employers (for example, Dossia, the consortium of eight of America’s largest employers), 
are not covered by HIPAA.28  Because these tools are being designed for primary use by 
the consumer, individual authorization is typically required in order to move information 
into or out of a PHR.  As a result, the vendors of these products have concluded that a 
business associate agreement is not required; OCR has issued no guidance on this 
practice.   
 Personal health information is migrating onto the Internet through an array of health 
information sites, online support groups, and other on-line health tools.  Often this 
information is voluntarily posted or shared by individuals.  These potential repositories of 
sensitive health information are not covered by HIPAA as either covered entities or 
business associates – and privacy protections are guaranteed primarily through 
enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of the general prohibition against 
unfair and deceptive trade practices, such as a failure to follow promises made in a 
privacy policy. 
 
The gaps in HIPAA coverage of these new entities is of concern to some policymakers and 
industry stakeholders and may be an obstacle to promoting the use of these new technologies.  
For example, the public may not trust that their information will be protected when it is 
exchanged or stored electronically because these non-covered entities are not required to comply 
with any minimum health information privacy standards.  Covered entities may be concerned 
about an unlevel playing field, where their products and services are required to be compliant 
with current law and the products and services of their competitors are not. 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
Section 13408 of ARRA clarifies that entities transmitting or processing data on behalf of 
covered entities, like Regional Health Information Organizations (RHIOs), Health 
Information Exchanges, or E-Prescribing Gateways, are business associates for purposes of 
HIPAA.  Section 13408 also provides that vendors who contract with a covered entity in 
order to allow that entity, as part of its electronic health records, to offer patients a 
personal health record, must also be business associates.   Section 13424 requires HHS, 
working with the FTC, to issue a report within one year of enactment recommending 
privacy and security protections for information accessed and stored on-line.  This study 
must include a recommendation for which agency should have oversight over uses of health 
information on the Internet and a timetable for regulation.   
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 Amend HIPAA to create new categories of covered entities and require the Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR) to promulgate new privacy regulations to cover the activities of these 
new entities. 
 
Arguments For 
o Arguably provides the most certainty to the market and a more level playing field 
(even if the regulations applied to these new entities are tailored to the particular 
challenges raised by each, as is the case today among the major categories of covered 
entities). (steps to accomplish taken in ARRA) 
 
Arguments Against 
o This could be difficult to achieve, as some entities may resist coverage under HIPAA; 
others may welcome a more certain legal environment. 
o With respect to PHRs, some have argued that HIPAA may not be the appropriate 
vehicle for regulating those provided by non-health care entities.  For example, The 
National Committee for Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) called for protections at 
least equal to HIPAA to be extended to all PHRs – but did not recommend extending 
HIPAA to do so.29  The Center for Democracy & Technology has argued that HIPAA 
will not address the particular concerns raised by the handling of personal health 
information by Internet-based companies and other non-health care entities.30  Two of 
the prominent House bills from the 110th Congress – the “Protecting Records, 
Optimizing Treatment, and Easing Communication Through Health Care Technology 
Act of 2008” (the PRO (TECH) T Act) (H.R. 6357) and the “Health-e Information 
Technology Act of 2008” (H.R. 6898) (referred to collectively in this paper as the 
“House bills”) - instead called on HHS and FTC to work together to come up with 
recommendations (or regulations) for privacy protections for information in PHRs.31  
o This concern could be ameliorated by ensuring that all health care entities (including 
exchanges) that handle personal health information are required to comply with 
HIPAA (either as covered entities or business associates, depending on their structure 
and function), and imposing new standards on non-health care entities that provide 
protections similar to HIPAA but that are targeted to address the particular concerns 
raised in this environment. 
 
 Require (or encourage) HHS to issue new regulations or guidance to clarify that entities 
such as health information exchanges or PHRs that receive protected health information 
from a covered entity must enter into a business associate agreement and at least be 
contractually bound to safeguard the information and comply with HIPAA. (partially 
addressed in ARRA) 
Arguments For 
o Does not require legislative action, thus potentially could be accomplished promptly 
in 2009. 
Arguments Against 
o Would likely apply only to those entities that are receiving protected health 
information from a covered entity and thus would not protect personal health 
information entered into PHRs or onto Internet health sites directly by individuals.  
Also, the business associate model currently applies to entities performing tasks on 
behalf of a covered entity (emphasis added).  Thus this model may make sense for 
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health information exchanges (or at least those that are operating for the benefit of 
their covered entity participants); but it makes less sense for PHRs, which operate for 
the benefit of the consumer. 
o Business associates are contractually obligated to adopt health information safeguards 
or to comply with HIPAA.  However, as discussed in more detail below, federal 
authorities cannot hold them accountable for failure to comply with HIPAA. 
 Require any entity that holds or manages protected health information to adopt policies 
that are consistent with fair information practices, which is the model typically relied on 
to establish appropriate policies for handling personal information. 32 
 
Arguments For 
o Model is endorsed by NCVHS and the Markle Foundation’s Connecting for Health 
multi-stakeholder initiative. 
o Ensures that anyone who handles personal health information is subject to at least a 
uniform baseline set of standards.   
o Eliminates need to continue to revisit this issue as the market evolves and new 
entities/models for sharing health information are introduced. 
o Partial coverage can be achieved by imposing the requirement as a federal funding 
condition. 
o Model is more consistent with data privacy standards adopted by the European 
Commission, thus helping resolve a potential barrier to global data exchange. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Could result in HIPAA requirements for some entities and other, less onerous 
requirements for other entities.   
o Fair information practices (FIPs) provide a good model for moving forward – but 
FIPs are articulated so broadly that building trust in electronic health information 
sharing may require more clearly defined rules (and achieving broad support for such 
rules may be difficult). 
o If new framework deviates significantly from current HIPAA rules, there will be 
costs and disruptions in information flows due to covered entities and their business 
associates having to adjust to new or even dual standards.  Further, the resources 
already spent coming into compliance with HIPAA will be wasted.  (Note that these 
concerns could be ameliorated by building on the current HIPAA rules or by applying 
new standards only to entities not currently covered by HIPAA).   
 
 Keep the law in its current state and encourage the adoption of good privacy practices 
through voluntary business agreements and/or certification. 
 
Arguments For 
o Requires no further action from Congress or the Administration. 
o Less stringent approach arguably allows for more innovative responses to addressing 
privacy and security issues. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Compliance through voluntary business agreements or certification (or other 
voluntary business commitments) will not achieve a uniform baseline of protections.  
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Consumers do not always have the option to choose providers, plans or other health 
services based on privacy and security practices when care is needed and resources 
are scarce. 
o Will be perceived by some stakeholders as a lack of response to the privacy and 
security concerns raised by e-health; thus, may not accomplish much with respect to 
building trust in e-health systems. 
o Requires covered entities to continue the expense and administrative efforts to 
comply with the HIPAA privacy requirements and allows other entities working in 
the same space to be relieved of these corresponding responsibilities and expenses.  
B. What Is Covered 
 
Electronic health information exchanges and the rise of consumer-focused health management 
tools hold great potential for improving the flow of information necessary for good health care 
and helping individuals take a greater role in improving their own health.  But to realize this 
potential, consumers need to trust that their personal health information will be kept private, 
confidential, and secure.  As information becomes more accessible and moves more freely in an 
electronic exchange environment, current policies regarding access to, and use and disclosure of, 
health information may be inadequate and contribute to a lack of public trust in health IT.   
 
A number of the issues discussed below relate to perceived deficiencies in the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule.  Some argue that it makes little sense to try to re-open the compromises that were reached 
in the current Privacy Rule and instead urge policymakers to focus on how best to address the 
new challenges raised by the emerging e-health environment.  Others argue that perceived 
deficiencies in the Rule will need to be addressed in order to build trust in e-health, regardless of 
the source of the problem.  The following have been raised as issues that may need to be 
addressed in order to remove distrust as an obstacle to the widespread adoption of health IT and 
health information exchange. 
 
1. Addressing Privacy Concerns Through Anti-Discrimination Laws 
 
Some have suggested dealing with privacy concerns by prohibiting the use of personal health 
information to discriminate against individuals with respect to health insurance and employment 
- two of the key privacy concerns raised by consumers.  This is the approach taken in the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), which prohibits the use of genetic 
information to make health insurance coverage determinations and in employment-related 
decisions.  Some believe that passing anti-discrimination legislation based on health information 
or health status33 would address the most critical privacy concerns and relieve the pressure to 
enact standards that “micromanage” an entity’s use of health information, which could create 
obstacles to the information sharing that can improve individual health and the U.S. healthcare 
system. 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
 Enact federal legislation prohibiting the use of personal health information in determining 
the terms and conditions of employment or health insurance coverage. 
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each.   
Arguments For 
o As noted above, addresses the most critical consumer fears about use of their health 
information; could obviate need for specific, detailed provisions on information uses 
for other purposes. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Raises larger public policy issues that in the past have been difficult to resolve and 
that should be discussed in the broader context of health reform (e.g., to what extent 
employers can use health status in making employment decisions, particularly where 
fitness for duty is a work issue; and to what extent should government (particularly 
the federal government) regulate the business of insurance, which is dependent on the 
ability to assess and manage health claims risk).   
o May be more difficult than enacting specific standards governing use of information 
in a range of other contexts; even if anti-discrimination legislation could be enacted, it 
wouldn’t necessarily resolve all privacy concerns. 
 
2. Lack of a Federal Breach Notification Standard 
 
Prior to passage of ARRA, there was no federal law requiring that individuals be notified if their 
personal health information is breached – i.e., inadvertently disclosed to or accessed by the 
public or persons or entities not authorized to see it.  A number of states have enacted laws 
requiring persons to be notified if their personal data is breached.  Only three of these laws 
explicitly apply to identifiable health information,34 but some general state breach notification 
laws may be interpreted to apply to health information.35  As a result, individuals only had a 
right to be notified if their personal health information is inappropriately accessed or disclosed if 
they happened to live in a state with an applicable law, or if their information was breached by 
an organization that voluntarily provides breach notification as part of its risk mitigation 
practices.  Receiving notice of health data breaches gives individuals an opportunity to prepare 
or to try to minimize any potential damage (if possible).  A breach notification requirement also 
arguably provides incentives for holders of health data to take the strongest measures possible to 
protect against br
 
Possible Solutions 
 
Sections 13402 and 13407 of ARRA establish a federal breach notification law that applies 
to entities covered by HIPAA and vendors of personal health records and other Internet-
based health entities.   
 
 Establish a federal breach notification law that applies to identifiable health information.  
(arguably accomplished in ARRA) 
 
Arguments For 
o Establishes a national right of individuals to be notified if health information is 
breached and establishes national consensus on what constitutes a breach. 
o Enactment of a strong federal standard could help facilitate stakeholder agreement for 
preemption of state health information breach notification laws, which would provide 
a more consistent policy environment for organizations that operate nationwide. 
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o Could be done by regulation (modification to the Privacy Rule) with respect to 
covered entities.  
 
Arguments Against 
o Could be difficult to come to consensus on the trigger for breach notification.  
However, without such a standard, consumers could be inundated with alerts about 
data breaches that do not involve their information, where there is little chance data 
recipients could access their personal information, or that the breach would be used to 
harm them.  California, for example, imposes a strict liability standard – requiring 
notification except in cases where the data is encrypted.  Other states follow a harm-
based standard – requiring notification only if the individual suffers some type of 
harm.  Consumer advocates argue that defining “harm” with respect to breaches of 
personal health information requires a standard beyond financial harm, such as 
discrimination, stigma, or embarrassment.  Data holders may find it difficult to 
determine whether or not a particular breach rises to this standard; consumers may 
not trust data holders to appropriately make this determination on their behalf.   
o If requirement applies only to covered entities, it leaves out many organizations and 
institutions that hold or manage personal health information, including: HIPAA 
business associates (who could be required in regulation to notify the covered entity 
of any breach); PHRs offered by non-HIPAA covered entities; and Internet health 
sites that collect personal health information.  Imposing a requirement to notify 
individuals of breaches on these entities would require a law of broader application, 
which may be more difficult to enact. 
 
 Status quo (i.e., leave for states to address or to market forces).  
 
Arguments For 
o Companies will develop more innovative technologies for protecting information if 
they compete based on their privacy and security policies and practices, including 
those dealing with breach notification. 
o It is not clear that that this is a new issue raised by the movement to electronic 
records, which suggests it is not something that needs to be addressed at this time. 
 
Arguments Against 
o It is unclear that this is something the market alone will fix.  Entities holding health 
information would likely come to different conclusions as to whether or not it is 
necessary to notify in the event of a breach.    
o Breaches of greater volumes of records are more likely to occur as we store and move 
information electronically.  Failure to address this issue creates an obstacle to 
building trust in e-health systems.  
o Relying on states is unlikely to achieve protection for all patients. 
o Continuing to leave this to state law exacerbates the inconsistent policy environment 
for health care entities that operate nationally or across state lines. 
 
3.  Need for Data Stripped of Patient Identifiers for a Range of Health Purposes  
 
The major health reform proposals all require the robust collection of health data for a number of 
purposes, including: measuring provider performance; determining whether particular treatments 
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are effective; monitoring health data for safety signals with respect to new drugs and devices; 
health research; public health surveillance and bioterrorism; and for commercial purposes (for 
example, determining how often providers are prescribing a particular drug product).  The 
Privacy Rule permits the use or disclosure of identifiable information for some of these purposes, 
including: quality assessment and improvement activities; public health reporting; and for health 
care operations such as the credentialing and licensing of health care professionals.  However, 
some of these activities occur now with the use of information stripped of patient identifiers, and 
some privacy advocates have begun calling for increased use of data stripped of patient 
identifiers in lieu of using fully identifiable information where it is possible to do so and still 
accomplish the purpose for which the data was legitimately accessed. 
 
The Privacy Rule includes two ways that covered entities may use or disclose data stripped of 
patient identifiers: de-identification and the limited data set.  Data that qualifies as “de-
identified” is not protected by the provisions of the Rule, and therefore there are no limits on 
how such data can be used and to whom it can be disclosed.   
 
Data can qualify as “de-identified” in one of two ways.  Under what is known as the statistical 
method, an expert must determine that the “risk is very small that the information could be used, 
alone or in combination with other reasonably available information, by an anticipated recipient 
to identify an individual who is a subject of the information.”36  The alternative method (often 
referred to as the “safe harbor”) requires that the covered entity strip out a number of specific 
data points, including name, address, identifying numbers, and biometric data.37  In addition, the 
covered entity releasing the data must have no actual knowledge, or reasonable basis to believe, 
that the information can be easily re-identified.38   
 
A limited data set is information stripped of a number of the same specific data points as 
required for the de-identification safe harbor.39  Covered entities may release a limited data set 
only for purposes of research, public health, and health care operations, and must execute a data 
use agreement with the entity receiving the data set that sets forth the permitted uses and 
disclosures of the data and that does not authorize use or disclosure in contravention of the 
provisions of the Privacy Rule.40   
 
Some believe the current de-identification and limited data set provisions raise a number of 
concerns: 
 
 The de-identification safe harbor standard is now more than five years old, and today 
there is much greater access to information via public databases (a development that will 
only increase in the future).  It may now be easier to re-identify data,41 and some have 
called for an update to the standard, or at least an examination of whether it is as effective 
as it was when first enacted.  Others have questioned whether it remains good public 
policy to allow data that fits the de-identification standard to remain uncovered by the 
Privacy Rule.   
 
 Limited data set users must commit to not re-identifying the data, and covered entities 
may only release de-identified data if it meets the standard, which is supposed to ensure a 
very low risk of re-identification.  But if data is re-identified, either by limited data set 
recipients or by holders of de-identified data, the ability to hold those persons or entities 
accountable is very limited.  In the case of a limited data set, the data holder is only 
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contractually obligated to the covered entity not to re-identify; a covered entity can be 
held responsible for the actions of the data set recipient if 1) the entity knew of a “pattern 
or practice” that constituted a material breach or a violation of the data use agreement and 
2) the covered entity took no action.42  With fully de-identified data, the information can 
be shared with non-covered entities and does not require the execution of a contract – 
thus there are no applicable legal prohibitions against, or penalties for, re-identification, 
and such prohibitions are not required to be imposed on the data recipient via contract 
(although nothing in the law prevents data holders from voluntarily imposing such a 
condition). 
 
 Researchers and others, including people with rare or chronic illnesses, are concerned 
that the limited data set and de-identification standards – in particular, the provisions that 
require the elimination of specific data points – make the data unusable for many research 
and public health purposes.  They would prefer some middle ground, where the data is 
stripped of those identifiers that can be easily used to re-identify (such as name, full 
address, and identifying numbers) but a sufficient amount of data is retained to 
accomplish the purposes for which the data is sought.   
 
Possible Solutions 
 
Section 13424 of ARRA requires HHS to study the current HIPAA de-identification 
provisions.  Section 13405 requires the Secretary to establish guidance on the “minimum 
necessary” standard, which must be followed for access, use, and disclosure of personal 
health information for most purposes other than treatment.  Until such guidance is issued, 
covered entities and their business associates are directed to use a limited data set to meet 
the minimum necessary standard if doing so is “practicable.” 
 
 HHS should seek the input of experts and the public and examine the de-identification 
safe harbor to determine if it is still robust enough to provide a very low risk of re-
identification, and make any appropriate revisions to the Rule.  (arguably accomplished 
in ARRA) 
 
Arguments For 
o Allows for a public process for re-examining the standard and helps ensure that any 
changes to the standard are based on the latest science. 
o The House bills each had provisions tasking HHS to examine the de-identification 
standard, indicating some support for such an initiative.   
 
Arguments Against 
o Because the current standard requires data holders to have no “reasonable basis” for 
believing the de-identified data could be used to identify an individual (and no actual 
knowledge that the information could be re-identified), the standard is already 
flexible and robust enough. 
 
 Create more options for use of health data stripped of some individual identifiers, and 
require data use agreements for all data disclosures (or at least all that do not meet the 
threshold of full de-identification).  (steps to accomplish taken in ARRA) 
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Arguments For 
o Could address concerns raised by some that the current options do not serve many 
legitimate needs for data stripped of some patient identifiers. 
o Could help entities use such “lesser identified” data for activities that today use fully 
identifiable data (for example, many of the activities covered by health care 
operations and some research). 
o Helps ensure that all data recipients are held accountable. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Policymakers will face a difficult task in determining the permitted uses of various 
new data set options.  Could result in an environment that is either less protective or 
overly stringent compared to the one that exists today.  
o Requiring data use agreements for all disclosures can be a cumbersome process with 
little relation to privacy protections. 
o Requiring such agreements could obstruct the flow of information for public health 
reporting, syndromic surveillance, bioterrorism detection, and other important public 
purposes.  
o Data recipients are only held accountable by the terms of their contracts.   
 
 At a minimum, require those who obtain data stripped of patient identifiers to commit to 
not re-identifying the data, except in specific circumstances (for example, notifications 
about a serious public health threat or drug safety/recall notifications). 
 
Arguments For 
o Attacks the key concern with respect to the use of data stripped of patient identifiers 
without the perceived risks associated with a more comprehensive re-opening of the 
Rule or the de-identification standard. 
 
Arguments Against 
o The arguments above apply here.  Most likely, this is possible only through a data use 
agreement, and currently such agreements are not required when information is de-
identified.  
 
4.  Prohibitions on Use of Personal Information for Marketing Purposes 
 
Among consumer views on health information privacy, use of their personal information for 
marketing purposes ranks among the top concerns.  For example, in a 2006 survey asking 
Americans about the benefits of and concerns about online health information, 77% reported 
being “very concerned” about their information being used for marketing purposes.43  The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule governs a covered entity’s use of an individual’s health information for 
marketing purposes, but there are no rules regarding use of health information for marketing 
purposes by entities not covered by the Rule.  With respect to information in personal health 
records, or voluntarily shared on Internet health sites, use for marketing purposes will be 
governed by whether the HIPAA Privacy Rule requirements apply, the vendor’s or site’s terms 
of use or privacy policy, or what individuals may knowingly or inadvertently authorize. 
 
The Privacy Rule prohibits covered entities from using a person’s identifiable information for 
marketing purposes without his or her prior authorization.  The definition of what constitutes 
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“marketing” is a communication about a product or service that encourages the recipient to 
purchase or use that product or service.44  The definition includes a number of exceptions that 
were crafted to allow covered entities to send important health-related communications to their 
patients and enrollees without having to first obtain individual authorization.  For example, 
covered entities may use personal information to communicate with an individual about his or 
her treatment; for case management or care coordination, or to recommend alternative therapies, 
providers, or settings of care; or to describe products or services in a benefits plan or value-added 
services available only to plan enrollees.45  Individuals whose personal information is used to 
make a communication exempt from the marketing rule also do not have the right to object to (or 
opt out of) their personal information being used for these purposes.46 
 
The Privacy Rule prohibits a covered entity from selling (without authorization) protected health 
information about its patients or enrollees to outside entities so that those entities can directly 
market their products and services.  However, such outside entities could pay the covered entity 
to use protected health information to make those communications – and as long as those 
communications fell under one of the exceptions to the marketing definition, authorization would 
not be required.  Some see this as a loophole, enabling outside entities to pay covered entities to 
send targeted marketing communications that the entities could not send themselves without 
express individual authorization.  Others believe the rule strikes the right balance – ensuring that 
protected health information remains with the covered entity (or its business associate), and 
allowing beneficial communications to be sent to patients and enrollees without having to ask 
first for patient authorization (which under the Privacy Rule must be fairly detailed).  
 
The polling data is clear that individuals feel strongly about the use of their information without 
their consent for marketing purposes.  There does not appear to be consensus, however, on 
whether the marketing provisions in the Privacy Rule need to be revised in order to build trust in 
e-health systems.   Some claim that direct marketing to individuals helps drive up the cost of 
care; others point to communications that can help lower costs and ensure individuals get 
appropriate care (such as communications to facilitate medication adherence, or about lower-cost 
therapeutic alternatives or free or low-cost prevention services).  
 
Policymakers have not yet begun to address concerns about the use of personal health 
information in PHRs and on Internet sites for marketing purposes.  
 
Possible Solutions 
 
Section 13406 of ARRA revises the HIPAA marketing rule to require prior authorization 
when an individual’s protected health information will be used to make a communication 
that is paid for (directly or indirectly) by an outside entity.  Exceptions include: 
communications about drugs or biologics that are currently prescribed for, or 
administered to, an individual - as long as the payment from the outside entity is 
reasonable in amount.  The provision also makes an exception for remuneration that 
constitutes payment for treatment of an individual.   Other related ARRA provisions 
include: Section 13406, requiring covered entities to allow individuals to opt-out of 
receiving fundraising communications; and Section 13405, prohibiting the direct or 
indirect receipt of remuneration in exchange for an individual’s protected health 
information. 
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 Strengthen HIPAA rules requiring prior authorization for use of personal information for 
marketing by covered entities and establish rules for use of information for marketing 
purposes by non-covered entities.  (at least partially addressed in ARRA) 
 
Arguments For 
o Attacks a key concern of the public with respect to uses of their health information.  
Could be structured in a way that permits some targeted communication with patients 
for legitimate health purposes but without creating loopholes that end up permitting 
the use of personal information for the purpose of marketing a broad range of health-
related products and services.   
o Could be accomplished by regulatory change with respect to marketing by covered 
entities and their business associates. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Would require legislation for non-covered entities. 
o Drawing the line between “good marketing” – using individuals’ information to send 
communications that clearly advance their health or health care – and “commercial 
marketing” – where the communication is arguably related to health but where the 
benefit to the individual is less clear or is secondary to the commercial interests of the 
entity sponsoring the communication – can be difficult.  There also are stakeholders 
either firmly committed to preserving the status quo or concerned that any changes 
could have unintended consequences for patient health or health care business 
operations. 
o There could be negative health consequences for individuals (e.g., no or less 
information about available benefits, treatment alternatives, etc.). 
 
 Increase compliance with the Privacy Rule’s current provisions by issuing additional 
guidance about the types of communications that are or are not “marketing.” 
 
Arguments For 
o Does not require amendment to the Rule (although could be done in conjunction with 
amending the Rule to enhance understanding of the Rule’s provisions and improve 
compliance). 
o Could result in more communications, which today are allowable under different 
interpretations of the marketing exemptions, being deemed to be “marketing” and 
therefore requiring prior authorization.   
o Would continue to allow essential communications to individuals that directly impact 
their health, care, and outcomes. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Depending on the content of the guidance, could inadvertently bless more marketing 
uses without patient authorization than occur today. 
o Because it preserves the perceived inadequacies in the current Rule, unclear how well 
such an initiative would build consumer trust. 
 
 Leave Rule as is for current covered entities but set more stringent rules for use of 
information for marketing purposes by health information exchanges, and adopt rules 
governing marketing uses by PHRs and Internet health sites. 
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Arguments For 
o Avoids more difficult re-negotiation of the Rule for current actors and instead targets 
new challenges raised by e-health. 
o Challenge of finding a viable business model for electronic exchange networks – and 
potentially PHRs – makes the information held in or exchanged through these 
vehicles a potentially attractive target for marketers, strengthening the case for 
targeting this area for strong regulation. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Does not address what some perceive to be deficiencies in the Rule today (for 
example, the use of protected health information without prior patient authorization 
by covered entities to send communications that are paid for by an outside company 
and that encourage the patient to use that company’s goods and services). 
o Depending on the terms of the specific rule, could potentially cut off a source of 
operating revenue for these exchanges. 
 
 Change Rule from the current “opt-in (but with exceptions)” approach to instead allow 
individuals to opt-out of receiving all marketing communications, including those that 
today are exempt from the definition of marketing. (at least partially addressed in 
ARRA) 
 
Arguments For 
o Could be easier to implement without the need to determine which communications 
are “good” (and thus should be permitted without authorization) and which should 
first require explicit patient permission. 
o Assumes patients want to receive these communications but empowers patients to 
stop them if they object. 
o In a variation, could also retain the authorization requirement for communications 
that qualify under the current marketing definition (thus, permitting opt-out for those 
communications that are currently exempt from the definition but that consumers 
could still view as marketing).   
 
Arguments Against 
o Places burden on individual to police how their information is and isn’t used – clear 
boundaries on use of information provide more reliable protections for privacy. 
o Arguably less protective than current rule, which requires authorization to use 
information for marketing with some exceptions (unless authorization requirement is 
retained for those uses that currently qualify as marketing). 
o Stifles needed information for individuals and could result in negative health 
outcomes. 
 
 Leave current Rule as is; allow non-HIPAA covered entities to compete on the basis of 
their policies with respect to use of information for marketing purposes (HIPAA-covered 
entities could also voluntarily implement more stringent controls on uses of information 
for marketing purposes, and compete on that basis). 
 
Arguments For 
o Does not require changes to current law. 
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o Could lead to more privacy-protective environment if robust “privacy competition” 
emerges. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Few individuals know the extent to which their information is used to market or make 
health-related communications to them.  Thus, they may be unlikely to inquire or 
make decisions based on use of their information for these purposes.  This may be 
particularly true in a health care context, where choice of care provider involves a 
myriad of important variables – and where many individuals do not have choices (or a 
wide range of choices) with respect to their sources of care.   
o Unless the policy is clearly articulated, explanations of uses of information in a 
privacy policy may not be clear.  A clear policy could explicitly state, in part: “we do 
not use your information to recommend products or services to you under any 
circumstances”.  
 
5.  Other Areas where HIPAA Could be Strengthened 
 
As personal health information is accessed and exchanged more easily in the new electronic 
environment, HIPAA policies regarding access to, and use and disclosure of, health information 
may be inadequate and contribute to a lack of public trust in health IT and health information 
exchange.  Some of these issues are new ones raised by the new e-health environment, while 
others were initially raised during the HIPAA regulatory debates and may or may not be 
exacerbated by the new information sharing models.  In the past year policymakers have 
considered addressing the following: 
 
 Uncertainty regarding how to apply the “minimum necessary” standard.  Under the 
Privacy Rule, access to, and uses and disclosures of, personal health information must be 
limited to the minimum necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose for accessing the 
information, except with respect to treatment.47  This standard was intended to be flexible 
in order to accommodate a broad range of circumstances, but the lack of clear boundaries 
has resulted in a great deal of confusion about how to comply.48  Some believe further 
guidance on the minimum necessary standard could help resolve this uncertainty. (As 
noted on page 16, ARRA requires the Secretary to issue guidance on the minimum 
necessary standard and strongly encourages the use of a limited data set.) 
 Perception among some privacy and patient advocates that “health care operations” 
permits too much sharing of personal health information.  Under the Privacy Rule, 
“health care operations” is specifically defined.  However, a number of the descriptions 
are very broad and permit use and disclosure of personal health information for functions 
that could be achieved without patient identifiers or could be done only with the consent 
or authorization of the patient.  For example, health care operations include activities 
such as: conducting quality assessment and improvement activities; reviewing the 
competence or qualifications of health care professionals; underwriting and premium 
rating; auditing; and business management and general administrative activities - such as 
due diligence related to a merger, customer service functions, and fundraising for the 
benefit of the covered entity (see Appendix B for a complete list).  The Privacy Rule also 
permits covered entities to share health information with another covered entity for the 
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purpose of the recipient entities’ health care operations, as long as both entities have a 
relationship with the patient.49  
 The PRO(TECH)T Act of 2008 would have required patient consent (not authorization) 
for health care operations uses.  A number of stakeholders expressed concern that this 
provision would significantly stifle uses of health care information for important 
purposes like public health and quality measurement; others noted that because treatment 
and coverage could be conditioned on patients giving their consent to health care 
operations uses, it would provide little meaningful privacy protection.  The Health-e 
Technology Act of 2008 took a different approach, tasking HHS to examine the 
definition of health care operations and determine which functions could be performed 
with de-identified data and which should require prior authorization.  
 Uncertainty regarding which Privacy Rule provisions should apply to health information 
exchanges.  As noted above, the Privacy Rule historically has not applied to health 
information exchanges (for example, RHIOs, HIEs, and ePrescribing Gateways), except 
those that may qualify as healthcare clearinghouses.  Many of these entities have 
executed business associate agreements with the covered entities that participate in the 
exchange.  However, it is not clear that all have done so, which has prompted some to 
call for a requirement that these exchanges either be covered entities or enter into 
business associate agreements (depending on their structure and function). (As noted 
above, ARRA clarifies that some of these entities must enter into business associate 
agreements.) 
But securing coverage under HIPAA, either directly or as a business associate, only 
addresses part of the question.  Once covered, policymakers need to determine the data 
access, use, and disclosure rules that will apply to these new entities.  For example, 
should a person’s identifiable health information be used in these exchanges only for 
treatment of the individual, or can it be accessed to treat another individual?  Under the 
Privacy Rule today, covered entities can use one patient’s identifiable information for 
treating another patient.50  This permissive use raises privacy concerns, particularly when 
data on any patient can be accessed across multiple institutions and providers 
participating in a network.  Should exchanges be accessible for payment purposes, or to 
accomplish health care operations?  Should exchanges exist only to facilitate the health 
care activities of the covered entities participating in the exchange, or should the 
exchange itself be permitted to use data for its own purposes?  What if some of the 
entities providing support for and participating in the exchange are not themselves 
covered by HIPAA?  In the absence of clear rules, health exchanges are working out the 
rules of the road on their own, often with multi-stakeholder involvement.  There has been 
no objective study of the results to date. 
 Confusion regarding whether quality improvement uses of identifiable health information 
is a health care operation (not requiring patient consent) or research, which requires 
authorization except in certain circumstances.  As noted multiple times throughout this 
paper, health reform proposals are looking to health IT as the linchpin for providing the 
data that will help improve quality of care.  The Privacy Rule permits the use of 
identifiable health information without patient consent for “quality assessment and 
improvement activities, including outcomes evaluation and development of clinical 
guidelines” – as long as “obtaining generalizable knowledge is not the primary purpose 
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of any studies resulting from those activities.”51  The Privacy Rule also permits the use of 
identifiable information without patient consent for population-based activities relating to 
improving health or reducing health care costs, and protocol development.52  Separate 
provisions of the Privacy Rule permit covered entities to use and disclose identifiable 
information for research purposes; such research requires specific authorization from the 
patient unless an IRB or Privacy Board waives the requirement based on the low risk to 
patient privacy.53  (As noted above, use of de-identified data or a limited data set for 
research purposes is also permitted and in most cases will not require prior patient 
authorization.)  Confusion about which provision applies to what types of quality 
improvement activities could hinder efforts to implement more robust measurement and 
other quality improvement efforts.  (Some have expressed concerns about the possible 
negative impact of ARRA’s prohibition (13405) on the receipt of remuneration for 
protected health information on uses of data for research and public health.) 
 Inability to meaningfully restrict access to and disclosure of health information.  Under 
the Privacy Rule, individuals have a right to request a restriction on the use and 
disclosure of their health information – but covered entities are neither required to 
comply with the request, nor provide a reason for noncompliance.54  If a covered entity 
grants the request, however, it must comply.  Some have advocated for granting a 
stronger right to restrict access to information, particularly with respect to information 
that is exchanged electronically through the “National Health Information Network” 
(NHIN).  For example, NCVHS has recommended allowing people to choose whether or 
not their information is included in the NHIN, and to be able to restrict network access to 
data in certain sensitive categories.55  In its recommendation regarding the right to restrict 
access to sensitive information, NCVHS acknowledged that few individuals would likely 
make such a request; but noted that individuals would strongly value the right and ability 
to do so.56 (Section 13405 of ARRA gives individuals a right to request a restriction 
on disclosures to health plans for payment and health care operations when they 
pay for their care out-of-pocket in full). 
Technology may improve the ability for health data holders to segregate sensitive data 
and comply with a patient request to restrict data access.  However, if compliance with 
such a restriction is mandatory, providers, plans and other health data holders will likely 
seek to be held harmless for inadvertent access and disclosure of information in 
contravention of a patient’s requested restriction, as long as the holders used reasonable 
efforts to comply.  NCVHS also recognized that providers should be notified if a patient 
has decided to sequester or restrict access to information in a sensitive category, but they 
left for further discussion how this notification would take place.57  Further, a 
requirement that applies only to those with electronic records risks creating disincentives 
for providers and others to move from paper to electronic systems.   
 Uncertainty over patients’ rights to access their records electronically, or receive an 
electronic copy.  The effort to engage more individuals in their health care through the 
use of consumer-facing electronic tools such as PHRs will not be successful if individuals 
cannot easily and promptly obtain electronic access to, or electronic copies of, their 
health records.  Under the Privacy Rule, patients have the right to access, and obtain a 
copy of, their health information in the form or format requested, “if it is readily 
producible in that form or format.”58  Some believe that this language already obligates 
providers and plans with electronic health records to provide an electronic copy of the 
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record.  Anecdotal reports, however, suggest that providers are not clear on their 
obligations and that patients have had difficulty obtaining copies of their health records in 
electronic format, in part because not all electronic health record applications facilitate 
the easy production of electronic copies.  In general, difficulty in obtaining a copy of 
one’s record, even in paper format, is the one of the top five HIPAA complaints 
investigated by OCR.59  Also, some believe that the timeframe for responding to a 
records request – which is at least 30 days under the current Rule60 – should be shortened 
when those records are kept electronically, and that the cost to consumers of obtaining an 
electronic copy should be free or set at a level more commensurate with the costs of 
making electronic an electronic copy available.  Under the current Rule, such costs are 
required to be “reasonable” and “cost-based”;61 however, most states set limits on 
copying charges for medical records, which range from free (Kentucky) to $37.00 for up 
to the first 10 pages of a hospital record (Texas).62  (Section 13405 of ARRA requires 
covered entities using “electronic health records” (a defined term in ARRA) to 
provide individuals with an electronic copy.  Any fee charged for this electronic 
copy cannot exceed the entity’s labor costs in responding to the request.  Individuals 
can have their electronic copy transmitted to another person or entity, as long as 
their choice is “clear, conspicuous, and specific”.)  
 Controversy over the appropriate role for patient consent or authorization.  The Privacy 
Rule permits the gathering and sharing of information for a range of purposes without the 
need to first obtain the patient’s consent.  For uses and disclosures not specifically 
permitted under the Privacy Rule, a patient’s specific written authorization is required.  
An earlier version of the Rule would have required patient consent for treatment, 
payment, and health care operations; but providers and plans could have conditioned 
treatment or coverage on obtaining patient consent for these routine uses of their 
information.63  However, this version was harshly criticized by the health care industry, 
who argued that the requirements would hinder the delivery of treatment, the processing 
of payments, and other routine activities by requiring consent to be obtained over and 
over again.64  In response, HHS amended this version in 2002 before it went into effect 
and replaced it with the structure that is in place today:  permissive use of information for 
certain routine health purposes: authorization required for uses and disclosures not 
specifically enumerated in the Rule; and plans and providers may not condition providing 
coverage or treatment on the patient’s execution of such an authorization.65  A number of 
privacy advocates harshly criticized the amendment, and some continue to call for 
restoration of the earlier version requiring consent for nearly all uses and disclosures of 
health information.66  Others note that such consent could not possibly be voluntary, and 
that overreliance on consent unfairly shifts the burden for protecting privacy to 
individuals and not to the organizations holding the data.67  Some entities would not 
likely support such a proposal, as requiring individual consent for routine health care 
functions could stifle necessary payment and other important processes.   
 
Also relevant is whether there should be an enhanced role for patient choice with respect 
to whether or not health information is included in an electronic exchange network.  
Exchange networks across the country are considering, and some have begun to 
implement, consent policies that require people to opt-in to, or allow them to opt-out of, 
sharing their health information through an exchange network either in whole or in part 
(such as by provider or by type of information).68  In general, those networks must 
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balance the extent to which providing consumers with meaningful choice about having 
their personal information exchanged in a local, state, or national network increases 
patient trust and values individual autonomy against the consequences both for 
individuals and for the system of having potentially incomplete data available for 
treatment decisions and public health.  As noted above, NCVHS has recommended that 
individuals at least have the right to opt-out of information sharing through the NHIN.69  
Additionally, the Markle Foundation’s Common Framework released in 2006 - 
Resources for Implementing Private and Secure Health Information Exchanges, 
recommends giving patients control by allowing them to create a second or third identity 
for records they want to keep out of networked electronic records exchanges.70  Although 
a number of sources have begun informally tracking the policies of various exchanges 
throughout the country, there has been no systematic study of the impact of the various 
policy models being adopted. 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
 HHS could issue more guidance on how to comply with the Privacy Rule.  (As noted on 
page 16, ARRA directs the Secretary to issue guidance on the minimum necessary 
standard.) 
 
Arguments For 
o A common sense and prompt way to address a number of the above issues, including:  
confusion regarding the minimum necessary rule; which quality 
measurement/improvement activities are permitted without consent as health care 
operations and which constitute research and require authorization absent a waiver; 
and the obligation of covered entities to provide individuals with electronic copies of 
their health records.   
o Could be combined with a new system whereby stakeholders, without penalty, can 
ask the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to publicly opine on whether certain proposed 
health information uses or disclosures are in compliance with the Rule. 
 
Arguments Against 
o OCR is already under-resourced, and without a resource increase may not be able to 
issue guidance promptly and on as broad a range of topics as desirable.  Also 
probably not possible without more resources to institute any new program to 
publicly issue specific responses to stakeholder questions.  
o Guidance alone may not be sufficient to address all of the concerns raised above. 
 
 HHS could examine the health care operations definition and issue new regulations that 
limit the use of identifiable data without consent.  The regulations could require more of 
the current health care operations to be done with data stripped of some patient 
identifiers, or could potentially require authorization for some uses that today are 
permitted without consent.  Another possible option is for HHS to issue guidance on the 
“minimum necessary” standard that encompasses both the extent of data accessed, as 
well as the extent of “identifiability” of the data, for health care operations purposes. 
(partially accomplished in ARRA) 
 
 
 
O’NEILL INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 
GEORGETOWN LAW | 600 NEW JERSEY AVENUE NW | WASHINGTON, DC 20001 
www.oneillinstitute.org 
26 
Arguments For 
o Addresses directly one of the biggest concerns that privacy advocates have with the 
Privacy Rule. 
o Outcome could enhance privacy while still allowing the use of data for a range of 
operational purposes. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Health care industry has five years of experience working with HIPAA and will be 
concerned about not being permitted to use identifiable data for the same broad range 
of purposes as is permitted today.  A possible compromise could be to allow use of 
identifiable data only for an entity’s own health care operations, whether performed 
by the entity itself or a business associate on its behalf.  However, this compromise 
may not be feasible in a more interconnected health system. 
o Because of the significant interests involved, could be difficult to achieve, even in a 
regulatory context. 
o Requiring the use of data stripped of patient identifiers for routine operations could 
increase health care costs.  Additionally, as many health care operations are closely 
linked to treatment and payment functions, delays may result in information sharing 
for these purposes as well as for health care operations that help facilitate quality 
improvement efforts.   
o Could result in broad requirements that negatively impact essential health care 
operations such as quality improvement programs. 
 
 HHS could issue new regulations regarding the terms of access to health information 
exchanges, including defining minimum standards for consumer choice. 
 
Arguments For 
o For states currently establishing exchanges, a clear set of baseline rules could clarify 
the difficulty of trying to achieve a mutual agreement among stakeholders. 
o Public trust will be enhanced if these entities are subject to enforceable rules about 
how they can and cannot use health information. 
 
Arguments Against 
o It is too early to establish rules to govern the behavior of these exchanges.  Premature 
regulation may stifle local variation and innovation.  (Note that, in the alternative, 
exchanges could at least be required to adopt policies that are consistent with a health 
fair information practices models such as the Markle Common Framework). 
o Viable business models for long-term operation of these exchanges have yet to be 
established and regulating too stringently or early in this space could jeopardize their 
implementation. 
 
 Filling gaps in HIPAA and establishing privacy protections that go beyond the HIPAA 
floor could occur through voluntary adherence to best practices or certification. 
 
Arguments For 
o Such an approach is consistent with the HIPAA model, which provides a baseline 
floor of standards and allows for states to adopt more stringent laws and for the 
private sector to voluntarily promote and adopt more stringent privacy protections. 
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o Likely easier to accomplish than regulatory or legislative change.   
o May be more cost-effective than imposing through a top-down regulatory approach. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Patients care about their health information privacy, but often don’t make health care 
decisions based on an institution’s privacy policies, as noted above.  There will be 
few (if any) market incentives for enhancing privacy, thus there is a strong role for 
public policy to play. 
o Voluntary adoption of best practices and certification is less likely to achieve broad-
based adoption of stronger privacy protection.  
o Certification, which typically occurs only in time intervals, may be inappropriate for 
ensuring adequate protections for privacy.  For example, a health IT product may be 
certified to include certain functionalities that are privacy-enhancing, such as role-
based access and audit trails.  But if these functions are not being consistently used, 
or if the entity is not monitoring compliance (or being actively monitored for 
compliance), certification does little to enhance privacy protection. 
 
C.  State Law Variation   
As noted above, because HIPAA was structured to provide a floor of protections, state laws 
providing more stringent protections for health information are expressly preserved.  Movement 
towards an interconnected national health information network raises concerns that the 
multiplicity of state privacy laws will create an obstacle to the nationwide electronic exchange of 
health information or the exchange of information regionally across state lines.  Others have 
noted the difficulty in determining a particular state’s health privacy laws, as they are often a 
combination of statute, regulation and guidance, customary practice, and common law. 
Possible Solutions 
 Establish a federal health privacy law that preempts all state health privacy laws. A 
possible alternative is to set a single federal standard that preempts existing state law (i.e., 
“wipes the slate clean”), but allow states to pass new laws establishing stronger privacy 
provisions (perhaps within a certain window of time). 
Arguments For 
o Should eliminate confusion and create a more consistent policy environment for 
privacy and nationwide electronic health information exchange. 
o Makes more sense in a health care arena increasingly dominated by multi-state 
players. 
o The alternative approach preserves the ability for states to re-enact those privacy 
provisions they deem to be most important while making it easier for cross-state 
actors to understand and comply with relevant laws (because there will likely be 
fewer of them). 
 
 
Arguments Against 
o Congress intended the HIPAA Privacy Rule to provide a floor of protections – not a 
ceiling.  Thus, if the single national standard is the set of current HIPAA rules, some 
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stakeholders will fight any attempts to decrease privacy protections for individuals 
living in states with laws that are currently stronger than HIPAA. 
o The more stringent state laws typically cover more sensitive health information, such 
as mental health, sexually transmitted diseases, or HIV/AIDS.  Efforts to eliminate 
these protections will be opposed by their constituencies and could erode public trust.  
o Another alternative is to create a national standard that is greater than HIPAA 
(perhaps using the states with the most expansive privacy protections as model) – but 
this may be opposed by industry stakeholders, particularly those whose business 
operations are primarily in states with less stringent privacy laws. 
o Many of the state protections for health data were enacted as part of state public 
health reporting statutes – so eliminating the protections could inadvertently 
jeopardize the reporting provisions.  
 
 Status quo - federal standards are a floor, with states able to adopt more protective 
measures.  Arguments for and against this option are the reverse of those for the above 
option. 
 
D. Improving Understanding of and Compliance with HIPAA Protections  
As noted above in the introduction, confusion about the Privacy Rule persists, which often 
results in overly conservative interpretations of the Rule and a failure to share health information 
even for legitimate purposes.  Some attribute this confusion to a lack of education about the 
substance of the Rule; others believe the Rule is too complex to be effective.  In addition, 
privacy advocates express concerns about what they perceive to be a lack of aggressive 
enforcement of HIPAA.  Others are concerned about oversight and enforcement over entities 
handling personal health information that are not covered by HIPAA.  This section of the paper 
discusses these concerns in more detail. 
1.  Complexity of the Rule/Lack of Understanding  
Possible Solutions  
Section 13403 of ARRA requires HHS to develop and maintain a “multi-faceted national 
education initiative” to educate individuals on the uses of their health information and 
their privacy rights. 
 Revise the Privacy Rule to make it less complex.  For example, rely more on broadly 
worded fair information practices and principles and address detailed circumstances 
through guidance, model policies, etc. 
Arguments For 
o Increases the likelihood that patients and covered entities will understand their rights 
and obligations. 
o Provides more opportunities for innovative approaches to protecting privacy. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Industry has had five years to become accustomed to current law.  Notwithstanding 
that some confusion persists, isn’t it more disruptive to start over? 
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o Arguably will not result in a consistent set of baseline rules, and consumers will have 
to read and understand an entity’s policies in order to get a clear picture of how well 
their health information is protected. 
o Alternative is to task HHS with identifying those areas of the Rule that have been the 
largest sources of confusion and target those for simplification.   
 
 Provide more guidance and better education on the requirements of the Rule to entities 
covered by it. 
Arguments For 
o More guidance and extensive education on the requirements of the Rules could help 
clear up any remaining areas of confusion. 
 
Arguments Against 
o There may not be resources at OCR to support an effective education program.  Is 
OCR the ideal entity to conduct this education, or are there better alternatives (such as 
an OCR partnership with health industry trade associations)?  
o Further, who would set the standards for such programs and is it possible to generate 
any measurable outcomes from them? 
 
 Improve consumer education on HIPAA rights by requiring entities to provide a one-page 
summary privacy notice, written in plain English at average reading levels.  This could be 
provided in addition to the more detailed notice; HHS could create models. (partially 
accomplished in ARRA) 
 
Arguments For 
o Ensures consumers are provided with a more digestible summary of the most 
important aspects of the Rule. 
o The summary would be provided in addition to the more detailed notice, which would 
still be provided for patients who want to read more details.   
o Is consistent with the “layered notice” approach recommended by privacy advocates. 
o If models are developed and disseminated by HHS, notices will be more consistent.  
This also helps promote greater understanding of the law. 
 
Arguments Against 
o HHS has insufficient resources to accomplish this. 
o It is already burdensome for covered entities to provide, and for patients to read, the 
extensive HIPAA privacy notice that is already required under the law – why should 
the response be to provide consumers with yet another summary of their rights? 
o Consumers may not welcome yet another notice about their privacy rights.  
 
2.  Compliance with the Rule and Enforcement 
When Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996, it included civil and criminal penalties for failure to 
comply with the statute, and these penalties applied to the subsequent privacy and security rules 
implemented years later.  But whether the HIPAA rules are being adequately enforced is the 
subject of some debate among policymakers and stakeholders.  
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OCR has not levied a single penalty against a HIPAA-covered entity in the nearly five years 
since the rules were implemented, even though that office has found numerous violations of the 
rules.71  The Justice Department (DOJ) has levied some penalties under the criminal provisions 
of the statute, but a 2005 opinion from DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) expressly limits 
the application of the criminal provisions to covered entities and not to individuals working 
within or on behalf of those covered entities (except in cases where an individual’s criminal 
behavior was actually sanctioned by the covered entity). 72  Although DOJ has prosecuted 
individuals for criminal HIPAA violations in at least two instances subsequent to the OLC 
opinion, some have argued that its release has had a chilling effect on HIPAA criminal 
enforcement.73  
Congress tasked HHS and DOJ with enforcing HIPAA: HHS for civil enforcement and DOJ for 
criminal enforcement.  Within HHS, OCR enforces the Privacy Rule, and the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) enforces the Security Rule.  State authorities may be 
able to enforce HIPAA if their state statutes authorize them to enforce federal consumer 
protection laws.  Otherwise, state authorities can only enforce state health privacy laws.  
Some privacy advocates believe that the failure of HHS to aggressively pursue civil monetary 
penalties sends a message to entities that they need not devote significant resources to 
compliance with the rules.  They also argue that, without strong enforcement, even the strongest 
privacy and security protections are but an empty promise for patients.  Privacy advocates also 
are concerned about HIPAA’s failure to include a private right of action, which leaves 
consumers dependent on the federal government and without a way to be made whole for any 
harm due to HIPAA noncompliance.  
 
Covered entities repeatedly express concern about protecting patient privacy and cite the 
potential irreversible damage to their reputations if patients lose confidence in their ability to 
protect personal health information.  The covered entities believe this provides a powerful 
incentive for them to comply with the law.  They argue that strengthening HIPAA’s enforcement 
provisions would have the unintended consequence of stifling appropriate health information 
sharing, because entities could over interpret the Rule in an effort to ensure that they are not 
using or disclosing information in violation of the Rule or in contravention of a patient’s right.  
They are worried that providing patients with a private right of action would have the same 
consequence and is more likely to profit attorneys than to provide a fair way of promptly 
compensating patients for any harm that results from failure of a covered entity to comply with 
HIPAA.  In addition, some believe that an enforcement approach that seeks voluntary 
compliance from covered entities is a more effective method for actually achieving compliance 
with the requirements. 
 
As discussed above in this paper, privacy advocates have also been concerned about the federal 
government’s lack of authority before the passage of ARRA to hold business associates 
accountable for failure to comply with HIPAA.  Instead, business associates could only be held 
accountable to the covered entities with which they contract for complying with the contract 
terms and any applicable HIPAA rules.  OCR could only hold covered entities responsible for 
the actions of their business associates if an entity knew of a “pattern of activity or practice of the 
business associated that constituted a material breach or violation” of its contract and the entity 
did nothing to cure the breach or terminate the contract.74  Of interest, if the covered entity 
decided that terminating the contract was “not feasible,” the entity was required to report the 
problem to the Secretary. 75  However, HIPAA did not give the Secretary any further authority to 
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enforce the statute and regulations against the business associate or to hold the covered entity 
responsible for the violation.  Entities serving in the role as business associates argue that 
contractual liability to the covered entity is sufficient to ensure enforcement of applicable 
HIPAA rules, as the business associate’s business and public reputation is at stake if there is a 
failure to comply.  
 
Some believe the enforcement provisions of the HIPAA statute are poorly worded and partly to 
blame for the current enforcement environment, while others attribute the Bush Administration’s 
discretion with respect to enforcement priorities and a lack of sufficient enforcement resources as 
more significant factors.  On the other hand, some industry stakeholders believe that the 
enforcement provisions in the statute and regulations provide sufficient and clear legal authority 
for enforcement of the rules, and that the combination of the law and non-legal penalties for 
failure to comply with HIPAA provides sufficient protection for consumers.  
 
For entities not covered by HIPAA, enforcement depends on the particular health privacy law 
that applies.  For example, the FTC can use its unfair and deceptive trade practices authority to 
penalize those companies that fail to abide by their privacy policies with respect to the personal 
health information they collect, manage, or store.  Similarly, for those personal health record 
vendors subject to the Electronic Communications Protection Act, the Justice Department can 
impose criminal fines and penalties against entities that release personal health information 
without the individual record holder’s authorization.  Such entities may also be subject to state 
law claims. 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
ARRA contains a number of provisions addressing the enforcement issues raised above: 
 Section 13401 makes business associates directly accountable to authorities for 
complying with applicable HIPAA regulations. 
 Section 13409 clarifies that HIPAA criminal penalties can be enforced against 
individuals. 
 Section 13410 clarifies that HHS can pursue a HIPAA violation civilly when 
criminal penalties could apply but DOJ declines to prosecute. 
 Section 13410 also requires HHS to impose civil monetary penalties in cases of 
willful neglect of HIPAA rules (and requires the Secretary to formally investigate 
any complaint where the facts indicate a possible violation due to willful neglect). 
 Section 13410 increases the civil monetary penalties for HIPAA violations. 
 Section 13410 authorizes State Attorneys General to enforce HIPAA. 
 Section 13411 requires the Secretary to conduct periodic audits for compliance with 
HIPAA regulations. 
 Section 13410 further requires that civil penalties or monetary settlements for 
HIPAA violations be transferred to HHS to be used for enforcement purposes.  In 
addition, GAO is required to propose a methodology for providing individuals 
harmed by HIPAA violations with a percentage of any penalties or monetary 
settlements collected; the Secretary is required to implement such a methodology 
within three years of ARRA enactment.   
 Section 13424 requires HHS to submit an annual report to Congress on 
enforcement. 
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 Ensure that there is an enforcement regime to address entities not covered by HIPAA that 
are handling personal health information.  (at least partially addressed in ARRA) 
 
Arguments For 
o Enforcement is a critical part of fair information practices.  Ensuring that non-HIPAA 
entities are subject to enforcement of either currently applicable standards or any new 
standards adopted by Congress and/or the new Administration should be a focus in 
2009. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Few will argue that some enforcement structure is needed to build public trust in 
these new health information exchange tools.  It may be harder to agree on the details: 
what the standards are, who enforces, whether the penalty structure is appropriate, 
etc.   
 
  Amend the HIPAA statutory enforcement provisions to clarify current enforcement 
authority.  The amendments could require the Secretary to formally investigate and 
impose civil monetary penalties in cases of willful neglect of the HIPAA rules.  Or, the 
provision could clearly state that the Secretary can pursue civil actions in cases where a 
criminal violation may have occurred but the Justice Department decides not to pursue 
the case.  Finally, an amendment could correct the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
interpretation of HIPAA with respect to the ability to pursue individuals who violate 
HIPAA’s criminal provisions.  (addressed in ARRA) 
 
Arguments For 
o Arguably this is just a clarification of current enforcement authority, so it may not be 
as controversial (note that provisions accomplishing the above were part of the 
Health-e Information Technology Act of 2008). 
 
Arguments Against 
o There is already sufficient statutory and regulatory authority to enforce HIPAA. 
o Covered entities may oppose any effort to clarify statutory enforcement authority, 
viewing it as opening the door to more aggressive enforcement.  
 
 Amend HIPAA to allow the Secretary of HHS to directly enforce the HIPAA regulations 
against business associates. (addressed in ARRA) 
 
Arguments For 
o Closes an enforcement loophole and allows the federal government to directly hold 
business associates accountable for complying with HIPAA (provisions to 
accomplish this were in the House bills). 
o Brings federal health privacy law closer to a data stewardship model (i.e., all entities 
that handle personal health information have to comply with baseline standards and 
can be held legally accountable). 
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Arguments Against 
o Will be vigorously opposed by entities who frequently act as business associates to 
covered entities.  Could cause these entities to be unwilling to contract with health 
care entities out of fear of increased penalties.  If these entities cease providing 
services, the cost of health care products and services could be affected. 
o As an alternative, policymakers could make covered entities responsible for the 
actions of their business associates, which will generate vigorous opposition from 
covered entities who do not want to be legally responsible for behavior not in their 
control.   
 Amend HIPAA to provide a private right of action for individuals to seek redress for 
HIPAA violations. (at least partially addressed in ARRA) 
Arguments For 
o Patients will not have to depend on the government’s taking action when their privacy 
rights have been violated. 
o Provides patients with a way to directly seek redress for privacy violations. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Will generate aggressive opposition, including from those promoting general tort 
reform.  A possible alternative is to re-direct some or all of the civil monetary and 
criminal penalties collected to individuals whose privacy is violated.  Provisions to 
eventually establish a method for distributing a percentage of civil monetary penalties 
to individuals harmed by HIPAA violations were included in the Health-e 
Information Technology Act of 2008.) 
o Not clear that allowing individuals to sue to seek redress for privacy violations is the 
most effective or efficient way to improve enforcement of privacy protections or get 
individuals compensation for harm due to a HIPAA violation.  
o Individuals are likely to be frustrated with such a cumbersome process.  Litigation is 
time-consuming and expensive.  Often, individuals are concerned with exercising 
their privacy rights under HIPAA (e.g., access, amendment) and litigation is neither 
an efficient nor cost-effective way to provide immediate results or access.   
o Increased costs from litigation expenses can affect overall health care costs for 
consumers.  
 
 Expressly authorize state authorities to also enforce the federal HIPAA rules. (addressed 
in ARRA) 
 
Arguments For 
o There is precedent for doing this (see CAN-SPAM, which authorizes state attorneys 
general to enforce federal anti-spam provisions76). 
o Devotes more resources to enforcement without a change to the current provisions. 
 
Arguments Against 
o Requires federal legislation to clearly authorize authorities in all states to enforce 
HIPAA. 
o Likely controversial, as covered entities may be concerned about overly zealous state 
authorities and the possibility that legitimate data sharing will be thwarted because 
entities will be more cautious.  Provisions were included in the as-introduced version 
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of Health-e Information Technology Act of 2008, but attempts to add such a 
provision to the PRO(TECH)T Act were unsuccessful because the provision did not 
have the support of all of the bill’s primary co-sponsors. 
o Potentially opens up the Privacy Rule to 50 different state interpretations. 
o Presents an opportunity for duplicate fines for the same acts/offenses. 
o Unclear whether this would result in better enforcement, as state authorities cannot be 
compelled to enforce federal law.  As a result, only those state authorities with a 
strong desire to enforce HIPAA will likely take advantage of the provision. 
 
 Status quo with respect to HIPAA enforcement provisions.  
 
Arguments For 
o There is no objective evidence that the current enforcement provisions are flawed.  
DOJ has pursued a handful of criminal violations, notwithstanding the OLC memo.   
o The new Administration should and will set its own enforcement policies with respect 
to criminal and civil HIPAA violations. 
o Covered entities will vigorously enforce the terms of their business associate 
contracts because it is in their best interests to do so, and business associates will use 
their best efforts to comply because it makes good business sense to do so.   
 
Arguments Against 
o Such an approach ignores the flaws in the statute, and the potential that the Obama 
Administration will have the same perceived difficulty as the Bush Administration in 
navigating them. 
o Such an approach fails to address the frustration felt by consumers about the 
perceived lack of enforcement of the law. 
o Such an approach leaves business associates with a free pass, creating an unlevel 
playing field. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many believe more efficient sharing of accurate health information is a critical factor in 
improving health care quality for individual patients and for the nation as a whole.  Health 
information technology provides the necessary infrastructure for creating the information-rich 
health care system we seek – but building the infrastructure is not enough.  Consumers, 
providers, health plans, and other health system stakeholders will be reluctant to put information 
in the system if they don’t trust that it will be protected.  Privacy and security protections are 
essential to building this foundation of trust and allowing us to reap the benefits that health IT 
can provide.  
 
For the most part, there is consensus that efforts to facilitate widespread adoption and use of 
health information technology must move forward with appropriate protections for privacy and 
security.  However, achieving consensus on the details of what privacy and security measures 
need to be put in place continues to be a challenge.  The enactment of ARRA represents a new 
generation of health privacy – but implementation challenges remain to be addressed. 
 
The new Administration and new Congress present us with new opportunities to break the 
privacy “gridlock.”  Notwithstanding other critical national issues that need urgent attention, we 
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have never had a better opportunity to pursue reform of our health care system, facilitated by 
interoperable health IT with protections for privacy and security.  Consistent with the goal of the 
Legal Solutions in Health Reform Project, this paper presents a range of possible solutions to 
privacy concerns that have been raised by some policymakers and stakeholders, along a few of 
the likely arguments for and against each.  Hopefully, it will be a catalyst for continuing to make 
progress on this difficult issue.   
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APPENDIX A – List of Possible Solutions by Issue Category  (issues addressed at least in 
part by ARRA are so designated) 
 
Who is Covered - Do we extend the privacy rules under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) to all entities that now handle health information, or create new 
legal standards for entities not currently covered?  
 Amend HIPAA to create new categories of covered entities and require OCR to 
promulgate new privacy regulations to cover the activities of these new entities. 
 Clarify business associate agreements.  Require (or encourage) HHS to issue new 
regulations or strengthen current guidance to ensure that entities receiving protected 
health information from a covered entity – such as exchanges or PHRs that offered by 
that entity– must enter into a business associate agreement or at least be contractually 
bound to safeguard the information and comply with HIPAA. (ARRA) 
 Require any entity that holds or manages protected health information to adopt policies 
consistent with fair information practices, which is the model typically relied on to 
establish appropriate policies for handling personal information. 
 
 Keep the law in its current state but encourage the adoption of good privacy practices 
through voluntary business agreements and/or certification. 
 
What is Covered - What protections need to be in place?  For example, do we rely on current 
HIPAA rules or are modifications needed either to address new challenges or because, in the 
view of some, the rules were insufficient from the start?  Are these concerns best addressed 
through changes in statute or regulations, or is it best to police this nascent marketplace through 
business best practices (or a combination of both)? 
Addressing Privacy Concerns Through Anti-Discrimination Laws 
 Enact federal legislation prohibiting the use of personal health information in determining 
the terms and conditions of employment or health insurance coverage. 
 
Lack of a Federal Breach Notification Standard 
 Establish a federal breach notification law that applies to identifiable health information.  
(ARRA) 
 Status quo (i.e., leave for states address or to market forces).  
 
Need for Data Stripped of Patient Identifiers for a Range of Health Purposes  
 HHS could seek the input of experts and the public and examine the de-identification safe 
harbor.  This could help determine if it is still robust enough to provide a very low risk of 
re-identification.  If not, HHS could make any appropriate revisions to the Rule. (ARRA) 
 Create more options for use of health data stripped of some individual identifiers, and 
require data use agreements for all data disclosures (or at least all that do not meet the 
threshold of full de-identification). (ARRA) 
 At a minimum, require those who obtain data stripped of patient identifiers to commit to 
not re-identifying the data, except in specific circumstances (for example, such as 
notifications about a serious public health threat or drug safety/recall notifications) 
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Prohibitions on Use of Personal Information for Marketing Purposes 
 Strengthen HIPAA rules for use of personal information for marketing by covered 
entities by requiring prior authorization in more circumstances.  (ARRA) Establish rules 
for use of information for marketing purposes by non-covered entities.  
 Increase compliance with the Privacy Rule’s current provisions rule by issuing additional 
guidance about the types of communications that are or are not “marketing.” 
 Leave Rule as is for current covered entities but set more stringent rules for use of 
information for marketing purposes by health information exchanges, and adopt rules 
governing marketing uses by PHRs and Internet health sites. 
 Change Rule to allow individuals to opt-out of receiving any marketing communications, 
including those that today are exempt from the definition of marketing. (ARRA with 
respect to fundraising by a covered entity) 
 Leave current Rule as is and allow non-HIPAA covered entities to compete on the basis 
of their policies with respect to use of information for marketing purposes (HIPAA-
covered entities could also voluntarily implement more stringent controls on uses of 
information for marketing purposes, and compete on that basis). 
 
Other Areas Where HIPAA Could be Strengthened 
 HHS could issue more guidance on how to comply with the Privacy Rule. (ARRA) 
 HHS could examine the health care operations definition and issue new regulations that 
limit the use of identifiable data without consent, which require more of the current 
health care operations to be done with data stripped of some patient identifiers, and to 
potentially require authorization for some uses that today are permitted without consent.  
HHS could also issue guidance on the “minimum necessary” standard that encompasses 
both the extent of data accessed and the extent of “identifiability” of the data, for health 
care operations purposes. (ARRA) 
 HHS should issue new regulations regarding the terms of access to health information 
exchanges, including defining minimum standards for consumer choice. 
 Filling gaps in HIPAA and establishing privacy protections that go beyond the HIPAA 
floor through voluntary adherence to best practices or certification. 
 
State Law Variation - Should we allow for some state law variation or establish federal 
standards that preempt the field? 
 Establish a federal health privacy law that preempts all state health privacy laws. 
 Status quo - federal standards are a floor, with states able to adopt more protective 
measures.  
 
Improving Understanding of (and Compliance with) Privacy Protections:  How do we 
ensure compliance and appropriate enforcement of privacy protections?  
 
Complexity of the Rule/Lack of Understanding  
 Revise the Privacy Rule to make it less complex.  For example, the rule could rely on 
more on broadly worded fair information practices and principles and addressing detailed 
circumstances through guidance, model policies, etc.) 
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 Provide more guidance and better education on the requirements of the Rule to entities 
covered by it. (ARRA) 
 Better educate consumers on their HIPAA rights by requiring entities to provide a one-
page summary privacy notice, written in plain English at average reading levels.  This 
could be provided in addition to the more detailed notice; HHS could come up with 
models. 
 
Compliance with the Rule and Enforcement 
  Ensure that there is an enforcement regime to address entities not covered by HIPAA 
that are handling personal health information.  (ARRA) 
 Amend the HIPAA statutory enforcement provisions to clarify current enforcement 
authority.  For example, require the Secretary to formally investigate, and impose civil 
monetary penalties, in cases of willful neglect of the HIPAA rules; make it clear that the 
Secretary can pursue civil actions in cases where a criminal violation may have occurred 
but the Justice Department decides not to pursue the case; and correct the Office of Legal 
Counsel’s interpretation of HIPAA with respect to the ability to pursue individuals who 
violate HIPAA’s criminal provisions). (ARRA) 
 Amend HIPAA to allow the Secretary of HHS to directly enforce the HIPAA regulations 
against business associates.(ARRA) 
 Amend HIPAA to provide a private right of action for individuals to seek redress for 
HIPAA violations. (ARRA) 
 Expressly authorize state authorities to also enforce the federal HIPAA rules. (ARRA) 
 Status quo with respect to HIPAA enforcement provisions.  
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APPENDIX B – Health Care Operations (defined at 45 CFR 164.501) 
 
Health care operations means any of the following activities of the covered entity to the extent 
that the activities are related to covered functions:  
(1) Conducting quality assessment and improvement activities, including outcomes 
evaluation and development of clinical guidelines, provided that the obtaining of 
generalizable knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies resulting from such 
activities; population-based activities relating to improving health or reducing health care 
costs, protocol development, case management and care coordination, contacting of health 
care providers and patients with information about treatment alternatives; and related 
functions that do not include treatment; 
(2) Reviewing the competence or qualifications of health care professionals, evaluating 
practitioner and provider performance, health plan performance, conducting training 
programs in which students, trainees, or practitioners in areas of health care learn under 
supervision to practice or improve their skills as health care providers, training of non-health 
care professionals, accreditation, certification, licensing, or credentialing activities; 
(3) Underwriting, premium rating, and other activities relating to the creation, renewal or 
replacement of a contract of health insurance or health benefits, and ceding, securing, or 
placing a contract for reinsurance of risk relating to claims for health care (including stop-
loss insurance and excess of loss insurance), provided that the requirements of §164.514(g) 
are met, if applicable;  
(4) Conducting or arranging for medical review, legal services, and auditing functions, 
including fraud and abuse detection and compliance programs; 
(5) Business planning and development, such as conducting cost-management and planning-
related analyses related to managing and operating the entity, including formulary 
development and administration, development or improvement of methods of payment or 
coverage policies; and  
(6) Business management and general administrative activities of the entity, including, but 
not limited to: 
(i) Management activities relating to implementation of and compliance with the 
requirements of this subchapter;  
(ii) Customer service, including the provision of data analyses for policy holders, plan 
sponsors, or other customers, provided that protected health information is not disclosed 
to such policy holder, plan sponsor, or customer.  
(iii) Resolution of internal grievances;  
(iv) The sale, transfer, merger, or consolidation of all or part of the covered entity with 
another covered entity, or an entity that following such activity will become a covered 
entity and due diligence related to such activity; and  
(v) Consistent with the applicable requirements of §164.514, creating de-identified health 
information or a limited data set, and fundraising for the benefit of the covered entity. 
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